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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The court did not recognize the difference between the president
and fiduciary of a corporation and a person acting as a private
owner. However, without expressly saying so, the reasoning of the
decision is not bottomed on sound principles and is open to serious
debate.
In the alternative, the court may not have pierced the corporate
veil, but developed its own position in this type of creditor's prior-
ity situation. It would hold that an equitable mortgagee, because
of value given for a security interest, would stand ahead of a mere
judgment creditor who dockets in the interim.
In conclusion, the most tenable solution would be to assume
that on these particular facts, when a president and sole share-
holder owns real property individually and his corporation mort-
gages it, he will be held to have joined in the mortgage and to have
mortgaged his own property.
DAVID S. NORMAN
Securities: Corporation's Recapture of Insider's Short-Swing Prof-
its-Technical areas of the law can be fascinating. A person
unskilled in a complex field, such as securities regulation, has diffi-
culty appreciating the subtlety of the issues buried in the language
of a court's opinion. Even the corporate planner often overlooks
any esoteric quality amid his contriving to avoid expensive pitfalls
for clients. Of particular interest are the problems which have
plagued the application of the deceptively simple insider-trader
provision, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
In the nearly forty years of the statute's existence, the United
States Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to every
case which turned on a construction of the section. Reliance Elec-
tric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.2 for the first time attempts to set
I. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) hereinafter cited as 16(b).
2. 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The only other 16(b) case which reached the United States
Supreme Court did not involve a construction of the terms "purchase and sale," but rather
involved the liability of a partner-director. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). There had
been confusion in the lower federal courts as to what policies were to guide the applicability
of the statute. Reliance, for the first time, attempts to define what types of transactions are
"purchases" and "sales" covered by 16(b). The statute has been a fruitful source of litiga-
tion, mainly because, although the plaintiff himself recovers nothing directly (the profit
recaptured inures to the issuing corporation), the courts have liberally awarded attorney's
fees, usually in the form of a percentage of the total recovery. For example, in Blau v. Brown
and Western Nuclear, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,263
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forth the approach for determining the types of security transac-
tions which trigger the imposition of 16(b) liability. In a 4-3 deci-
sion the Court held that the method used by a corporate insider to
dispose of stock did not constitute a "sale" which would require a
forfeiture of the over $715,000 profit realized because ". . the
method used to 'avoid' liability is one permitted by the statute."3
Hearings during the Great Depression disclosed that wide-
spread manipulations by insiders played a part in the stock market
decline. The most prevalent abuse involved profitting on advance
information by timing stock transactions with the corporation's
announcement of new developments (which had the expectable
consequence of stort-lived jumps in security market prices).4 Con-
gress intended to protect the investing public5 by either prohibiting
all trading by those with access to inside information, or preventing
only abusive and fraudulent practices.6 Opting for ease of adminis-
tration, the compromise wording of 16(b) was made simple and
inflexible for maximum deterrence. It provides that any officer,
director or more than 10% stockholder who engages in a short-
swing transaction (purchase and sale within six months) forfeits the
profits to the corporation regardless of motive or actual use of
inside information. 7
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), also noted in H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 605-606 n. 41 (2d ed.
1970), an amount equal to 20% of the short-swing profits recovered for the corporation, or
$7500, was awarded to an attorney who did no more than file a routine complaint. The
justification is that such fees provide the sole stimulus for the vigorous enforcement of the
statute. Comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an Alleged 16(b) Violation,
1968 DUKE L. REV. 94,103. Isadore Blau, represented by Morris J. Levy Esq., has been
the predominant plaintiff in the development of 16(b) case law.
3. 404 U.S. at 422.
4. See, e.g., citations collected, id. at 428-431 nn. 2-7.
5. Prior to the passage of 16(b) breaches of fiduciary duties of insiders were inade-
quately regulated. Aggrieved stockholders generally had no right to recover for the corpora-
tion any insider profits except under the "special circumstances" rule of Strong v. Repide,
213 U.S. 419 (1909). However, even this remedy was inadequate because of the heavy
burden of proof imposed upon the stockholders-usually to prove an actual use of inside
information.
6. Painter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Legislative Compromise or
Loophole, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 358 (1965); Comment, The Application of Section 16(b) to
Mergers: A Hidden Hazard, 47 TEXAs L. REV. 1417 (1969).
7. Section 16(b) provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than
six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such . . . owner . . . in entering into such transaction of
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Since 1934 the federal courts have applied 16(b) as a "crude
rule of thumb," imposing strict liability based upon objective stan-
dards in order to cover the evil with the "optimum prophylactic
effect." Upon proof of any set of transactions by an insider within
six months, which in some way resembled a "purchase" and
"sale," the courts would conclusively presume an abuse of his
position and automatically hold him liable.8 This harsh, no-
excuses-taken approach was regarded as vital to protect the public.
Problems arose because the simple language of 16(b) did not cover
complex exchange situations such as the conversion of bonds or
preferred stock into common shares, the granting and subsequent
exercise of options and warrants for the purchase of common
shares, the reclassification of securities in a corporate reorganiza-
tion and the intercompany security transfers involved in the acquis-
ition of another corporation. Also, where the facts indicated that
a 10% owner had no access to information, the "statutory fidu-
ciary" concept was seriously questioned. As a result of the inade-
quacy of the statute as written, courts were forced to resort to
specious logic to achieve a desired outcome.9 Consequently, case
law afforded little help in formulating an on-going rule to guide
clients.
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or
transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection. (Emphasis added.)
A beneficial owner covered by 16(b) is defined by Section 16(a) as: "Every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percentum of any class of any
equity security ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
8. The two leading cases illustrating this approach are Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), and Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). Munter, Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to 'Burning Down the Barn
in Order to Kill the Rats', 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1966). Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d
693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). See also Heli-Coil Corp. v.
Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
9. For instance, the courts have held a "purchase" to include a conversion from pre-
ferred to common stock, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); stock
disposed of through a consent decree in an antitrust action, Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965); and
transfers of stock from a subsidiary to its parent, Blau v. Hodgkison, 100 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). Also, a stock option was held to be a "purchase" when exercised, Booth
v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); and a
"sale" when granted, Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971).
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Recently, a few appellate courts, noticing that the morals of the
market place are being adequately policed by the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act, began advocating a shift in
16(b) construction to a more pragmatic, fact-oriented and subjec-
tive approach. 0 The threshold question in the ad hoc analysis is
whether the particular transaction could possibly fit within the
ambit of the practices which Congress intended to eliminate."
Once a potential for abuse is discovered, the stringent "crude rule
of thumb" provisions are applied in full force. 2 The objective of
the present analysis is to determine Reliance's contribution to the
federal common law concerning the proper application of 16(b).
In an attempt to wrest control from the incumbent manage-
ment and force a merger, Emerson Electric Co. purchased 13.2%
of Dodge Manufacturing Corporation in June, 1967.13 Dodge and
Reliance Electric Co. planned a defensive merger which confronted
Emerson with certain failure of its takeover attempt and with the
prospect of being forced to exchange its Dodge shares for shares
of Reliance-the successor corporation. Such an exchange of se-
curities for those of a different company had been determined to
be a statutory "sale."" Since the purchase of Dodge shares by
10. Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 45 (1968).
11. Mr. Justice Stewart (the author of the majority opinion in Reliance), while a judge
on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote the opinion which embraked on the initial
departure from applying 16(b) objectively. The statement of the subjective test was set forth
as the standard for decision as follows: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined
as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself
to the speculation encompassed by 16(b)." Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). The subjective test appears to have come into
its own with Ferraiolo; since then a trend in the cases toward the subjective approach has
become clearly discernible. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965). Note, Securities Regulation-Short Swing Profits-Pragmatic Approach to
Section 16(b), 41 TUL L. REV. 194 (1966); Comment, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to Corpo-
,rate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) 'Purchase or Sale'?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1969);
Hemmer, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits Pursuant to Mergers and Related
Transactions, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1101 (1969).
12. 117 U. PA. L. REV., note I I supra, at 1044.
13. Emerson had attempted to negotiate a merger between itself and Dodge. Since
Dodge rejected the merger proposal, Emerson, in an apparent attempt to acquire a majority
of the Dodge voting stock and then vote a merger, invited tenders of up to 550,000 shares
of Dodge stock at $63 per share. On June 16, 1967, Emerson purchased 152,282 shares of
the outstanding Dodge stock. Prior to that date, Emerson owned no shares of Dodge.
14. 404 U.S. at 420 n.2.
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Emerson occurred about one month prior to the imminent ex-
change of those Dodge shares for shares of Reliance, 16(b) liability
was inevitable if Emerson did not act immediately. Pursuant to a
two-step plan, devised by counsel, whereby it hoped to avoid liabil-
ity to the extent possible, Emerson sold 37,000 shares in August,
thereby reducing its ownership to 9.96%. Thus Emerson had moved
out of the over-10% category. Two weeks later the remaining
shares were sold to a different buyer. Reliance demanded the over
$900,000 profit realized; Emerson offered to pay only the $185,000
profit from the first sale, at which time it had still been an over-
10% owner. In an independent action, a court found that "...
Emerson did not have any 'insider' information about Dodge and
that all its knowledge about Dodge had been obtained from pub-
licly available sources."15
Section 16(b) provides that a more-than-10% owner is subject
to liability only if he were such "at the time of purchase and sale."
The ambiguity of this phrase presented the only loophole. Lack of
a comprehensive definition of the terms "purchase and sale" left
the status of unusual exchange transactions in doubt." Also, the
words "at the time of" could be interpreted to mean any one of
three instances relative to the particular event-just prior to, si-
multaneously with, or immediately after. For example, did the
section cover a situation where the condition of over-10% owner-
ship did not exist before a purchase, but did after? The right to over
$900,000 was to be determined by semantics.
Emerson's strategy was to argue initially that it did not have
to disgorge any profit because the purchase was not covered by
16(b). In the alternative, a definition of "sale" was sought which
would exclude its second disposition. Thus, Emerson commenced
the declaratory judgment action contending that under the particu-
lar facts it was not a 10% owner within the meaning of the statute
I) at the time of purchase, because "just prior" to the purchase it
15. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918, 920 n.5 (8th Cir. 1970).
Although this fact is irrelevant in the application of the statute under any method, it is
important in noticing the equitable operation of 16(b) in relation to its original purpose.
16. The definitions of these terms are found in the general definitional section of the
Act. The term "'purchase' ... include[s] any contract to buy, purchase or otherwise
acquire." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964). The
term " 'sale' . . . include[s] any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id., § 3(a)(14),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964). While everyday transactions through a broker are clearly
included within these broad definitions, the status of less ordinary, "unorthodox," acquisi-
tions and dispositions has often been uncertain.
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did not own any Dodge shares, 17 or 2) at the time of the second
independent sale because the first sale reduced its holdings to9.96%. 18
Reliance attempted to fit the situation within the literal words
of the statute by contending that Emerson was an over-10% owner
1) at the time of purchase, because 13.2% ownership was acquired
"simultaneously with" the purchase, 9 and 2) at the time of both
sales because a statutory sale encompasses a series of related trans-
actions pursuant to a plan of disposition."
The district court agreed with Reliance. 21 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the use of the "simultaneously with"
test for the time of purchase,22 but reversed on the ground that a
statutory sale is a single transaction or occurrence-an indepen-
dent sale "not legally tied to" another sale, made at a different
time to a different buyer.? Citing Helvering v. Gregory4 as an
analogous situation, the court held that a person may ". . . con-
duct his business in such a way as to intentionally minimize or
eliminate his loss of profits under Section 16(b) by any means
permitted by law."21 Thus the court condoned Emerson's split-sale
transaction and held that intent to avoid liability is irrelevant.
17. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 306 F. Supp. 588, 589 (E.D. Mo.
1969), and 434 F.2d at 922.
18. 306 F. Supp. at 590-591, and 404 U.S. at 421.
19. 434 F.2d at 922.
20. 404 U.S. at 421-423. The SEC supported Reliance's unsuccessful contention in an
amicus curiae brief in which it argued that the congressional purpose of the requirement of
10% ownership at the time of both purchase and sale was to cover all sales within six months
by one who had acquired 10% through voluntary purchase, and to exclude those who became
10% shareholders "involuntarily" (e.g., by legal succession or by a reduction in the total
number of outstanding shares of the corporation). It was contended that this interpretation
would not only cover Emerson's transactions, but would also preserve the mechanical
quality of the statute. The Court rejected the argument. One reason given was that such a
construction "flatly contradicts the words of the statute." Affirming a policy enunciated in
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the Court in effect said that regardless of how
persuasively the SEC may argue for an expansion of 16(b) coverage, the federal courts must
limit "... forfeiture of profits [to] only. . . those specifically designated by Congress to
suffer those losses." Id. at 425-426. For the second reason given, see note 36 infra.
21. 306 F. Supp. 588.
22. 434 F.2d at 923-924.
23. Id. at 926.
24. 293 U.S. 465, affg 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), which stands for the proposition
that desire to avoid taxation by arranging one's affairs such that his taxes will be as low as
possible is permissible. The taxpayer has "[t]he legal right . . . to decrease the amount of
what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits . . ." Id. at 469.
25. 434 F.2d at 925.
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The only issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether
approval of this particular set of dispositive transactions, struc-
tured to avoid insider liability, is consistent with the underlying
principle and purpose of 16(b). Or, stated another way, how should
a court analyze a specific situation, in this case the two-step sale,
to balance sufficiently the interest in preventing the unfair use of
information with the interest in a uniform and rational imposition
of liability?
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, affirmed the
court of appeals and extended the rationale. The opinion is based
upon the proposition that where an opportunity for abuse is inher-
ent in the particular type of transaction, and the application of
16(b) would serve the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing
speculation (the pragmatic approach), then the transaction in ques-
tion constitutes a statutory purchase or sale, which, if matched
within six months by an insider, results in automatic liability."6
The majority offered two reasons to support its conclusion that
the application of 16(b) to Emerson's second sale would not serve
the purpose of the statute. First, Congress intended to cover only
those transactions where the possibility of abuse is intolerably
great. The "intolerable possibility" test is objective and is met
when a 10% owner is such "both at the time of purchase and
sale. '2 7 Further, Congress determined that the chance of abuse is
minimal where a short-term owner moves in and out of the 10%
category.2 Since an objective "sale" constitutes a single, indepen-
dent transaction or occurrence, and the first sale moved Emerson
out of the 10% category, the potential for subsequent abuse was
tolerable, and thus the profit from the second step of the two-step
sale was not covered by 16(b). Secondly, Congress intended to have
liability predicated upon an objective measure of proof. Treating
26. Supra note I1. Mr. Justice Stewart reasoned as predicted along the lines of the
pragmatic approach which he conceived in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
The Supreme Court has never passed upon which of the two interpretations it consid-
ers appropriate to implement the Congressional intent of the section, but Justice
Stewart, . . .authored the opinion which embarked on the initial departure from
applying 16(b) objectively . . . so we at least have a good indication of which way
he would lean if and when the question is ever before the Court.
Davis, Conversions as Purchases and Sales Under Section 16(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 24 Bus. LAW. 1109, 1110 (1969).
27. 404 U.S. at 422-423.
28. ". . .[lI]t may be that Congress regarded one with a long-term investment of more
than 10% as more likely to have access to inside information than one who moves in and
out of the 10% category." Id. at 424.
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two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing intent by the seller
to avoid liability would detract from the mechanical quality of the
statute.29 Proof of intent is not objective, therefore Emerson is not
liable.
Now the question arises: what effect does Reliance have on
previous 16(b) case law? The obvious precedents set by the major-
ity are:
1. The pragmatic trend in the analysis of unorthodox, com-
plex transactions as constituting statutory purchases or sales is
given the highest authoritative approval. The Court resolved the
doubts and lingering confusion; 0 no longer is a literal, rigid inter-
pretation of 16(b) to be applied.
2. The "possibility of abuse" test was extended to an "intoler-
able possibility" test.
3. The federal courts still refuse to inquire into the insider's
intent, to the extent that liability will not be imposed merely be-
cause the investor intended to avoid such (i.e., technical formality
controls over the substance of the transaction).
4. When an owner of more than 10%, without actual access
to information, in the face of involuntary imposition of 16(b) liabil-
ity, executes a two-step sale whereby the first sale reduces his
holdings to less than 10%, then the profit from the second sale is
immunized from liability.
The case-by-case search for an "intolerable possibility of
abuse" undoubtedly removes some of the inflexibility and hard-
ship, but it does not solve the fundamental problem involved in the
application of 16(b) where no inside information is used for per-
sonal profit. Emerson nevertheless forfeited the $185,000 profit
from the first sale (while it was still a 10% owner). Will the courts
extend the reasoning to say that total profits are exempt? When
are ostensibly separate sales not "legally tied?" 3' A business law-
yer seeks certainty in the form of a general rule to guide clients in
avoiding expensive litigation. There is little certainty in diverse
29. Id. at 425.
30. "Until the Supreme Court does so state [its preferred construction], however, I
must, in good conscience, adhere to my literal and objective construction preference ...
Perhaps the Supreme Court one day will tell us how these somewhat conflicting approaches
to § 16(b) by the Courts of Appeals are to be resolved." Judge (now Mr. Justice) Black-
mun's dissent in Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967). Justice Blackmun was a member of the Court's majority in Reliance. 40
U.S.L.W. 4125 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1972).
31. For an elaboration on this quaere see 404 U.S. at 437 n. 11, citing 5 GA. L. REv.
584, 590 (1971), which is aimed at the court of appeals decision, 434 F.2d 918.
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judicial attitudes as to the degree of abuse inherent in a particular
situation.32 The majority's threshold search for congressional in-
tent would be practicable if such were clear. Instead, intent was
compromised in the final verbal expression of the statute, and the
courts are not sure of exactly what transactions are covered (all
insider trading or only some practices) and how rigidly (strict lia-
bility based upon objective standards, or allowance of defenses).
Thus the pragmatic approach of the majority involves an initial
conjecture as to whether Congress in 1934 would have been
abhorred by a 1967 fact situation which was "not comprehended
within the purpose" of the statute3 -a search for the will-o'-the-
wisp of legislative intent.
In furthering his favored construction through strained reason-
ing, Mr. Justice Stewart may have exposed the weak premise in-
herent in the approach. The extreme technicality that gives no
certainty to the application of 16(b) may, to some degree, be a
"mutilation of the Act" as Mr. Justice Douglas stated in dissent. 4
Hope for clarification from the source-Congress-has long been
abandoned, 3 and the power of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion to exempt transactions is still subject to doubt. Thus any
32. 117 U. PA. L. REv. supra note I1, at 1060.
33. The label given to transactions which the final phrase of 16(b) authorizes the SEC
to scrutinize and exempt from the operation of 16(b) if it were to see fit.
34. 404 U.S. at 428. Justice Douglas used the same comment in his dissent to the
majority's analysis in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the only other direct 16(b) case
to reach the United States Supreme Court. Reliance appears to be the result of a long-
festering difference of opinion as to 16(b) construction. Justice Stewart prevailed in Reliance
because he was able to win over the tie-breaking member of the Court. The reasoning is
contrary to Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (improper use of inside information by corporate insiders is most likely to occur in
short-term, in-and-out trading).
35. Immediately after enactment of 16(b), clarifying amendments were advocated to nip
in the bud the accurately predicted litigational problems.'Seligman, Problems Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 1, 34 (1934). In the almost forty years of the
section's existence, Congress has rarely limited or restricted its coverage. Munter, supra
note 8, at 100, proposed substantial revision in 1966. Lowenfels, supra note 10, at 64,
concluded in 1968 that legislative action was not likely and that the solution would lie in
further judicial construction.
36. Supra note 33. "The courts have read this limitation to mean that they [the courts]
have the authority to determine whether a particular transaction lends itself to insider abuse
even if it comes within the terms of an SEC exemption." 47 TEXAs L. REv. supra note 7,
at 1429. Pursuant to its authority, the SEC has promulgated S.E.C. RULE 16a-10, 17
C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1953), providing that transactions not required to be reported under
16(a) are exempt from 16(b) as well. A 10% owner is required by 16(a) to report at the end
of each month any changes in his holdings in the corporation during that month. The SEC
interpreted 16(a) to require a report only if the stockholder held more than 10% at some
[Vol. 56
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improvement must come from further judicial construction.
The minority opinion in Reliance, using essentially the same
case law authority,37 goes to the heart of the problem and suggests
a viable solution. The dissent is based upon the proposition that
all transactions by an insider falling within the broad language of
16(b) are automatically presumed to be tainted by the proscribed
activities (the "crude rule of thumb" approach). But the new pro-
posal is that the defendant may rebut the presumption by carrying
the affirmative burden of proving that his particular ". . . series
of dispositive transactions were not of a type that afforded him an
opportunity for speculative abuse of his position as an insider. ' 38
This viewpoint is justified on the ground that Congress intended
to have 16(b) apply to all insider purchases and sales,39 not just
those where the possibility of abuse is intolerably great. Also, Con-
gress primarily intended to reduce the plaintiff's burden, not
merely to make the proof completely objective (which operated in
this case to insulate the insider's profts)°
time during the month. FORM 4, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securi-
ties, RELEASE No. 6487 (March 9, 1961), 17 C.F.R. § 249.104 (1962). Emerson was a
13.2% owner at the time of its August 28 sale whereby its holdings were reduced to 9.96%;
its second sale (the profit from which is the subject of the litigation presently under analysis)
was on September 11. Presumably Emerson's second sale would be exempt from the 16(a)
reporting requirements and hence from 16(b) liability. The majority in Reliance affirmed
the exemptive power of the SEC by using it as additional authority for holding Emerson
not liable under 16(b) and for rejecting the SEC's amicus curiae argument. 404 U.S. at 426.
Therefore it appears to be the "law of the land" that the SEC has the power to exempt
transactions from the operation of 16(b), and that this power is beyond the scope of judicial
review, rejecting Green v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957). But Mr. Justice Douglas
castrates this proposition by pointing out that Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1969) held ". . . that Rule 16a-10 was invalid, insofar as it operated through
Form 4 to exempt transactions by ex-directors from liability under § 16(b)," because it
"... was 'an arbitrary [and] unnecessary loophole in the effective operation of the statu-
tory scheme,' id., 406 F.2d at 269." 404 U.S. at 441. In response to Feder the SEC removed
the arbitrariness as it applied to directors by requiring disclosure of all transactions within
six months before appointment, and six months after resignation. S.E.C. RULE 16a-l, 17
C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (d,e) as amended Sept. 30, 1969. "Thus, the restrictive reporting re-
quirements relied upon by the majority apply only to beneficial owners [of over 10%], itself
an arbitrary distinction." 404 U.S. at 441 n.14. Therefore, the rule (allowing eX-10% owners
to escape 16(b) liability merely by postponing the second sale until the following month),
when under attack, would also fall as being "an arbitrary and unnecessary loophole in the
effective operation of the statutory scheme." The result is that the exemptive power of the
SEC is still in a state of confusion.
37. The majority and the court of appeals, 434 F.2d 918, used the same case law in
holding Emerson not liable under 16(b) for the profits of its second sale.
38. 404 U.S. at 440.
39. Id. at 430, 442.
40. Id. at 431 n.8.
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Mr. Justice Douglas desired to hold Emerson liable for the
profits of both sales by reasoning that the terms of the statute were
intentionally left simple so as to be construed broadly to cover
many "unorthodox" transactions. According to the minority opin-
ion, a broad definition of "sale" easily comprehends "the sequence
of relevant transactions" pursuant to a single plan of disposition,
i.e., substance rather than technical formality. Therefore both
parts of Emerson's split-sale were covered by 16(b), and the auto-
matic presumption was triggered.4 Since Emerson conceded that
it could not meet the burden of proof necessary to rebut, 2 and since
"[t]he potential for abuse of inside information in the present case
is self-evident, ' 43 the presumption should control and Emerson
should be held liable.
If purporting to remove the harshness and improve the applica-
tion of 16(b), why did not the minority also find that Emerson's
profit from the second sale was exempt, and extending the reason-
ing, why was the profit from the first sale covered? In other words,
why a dissent rather than a concurring opinion? The answer might
lie in the fact that the case came to trial mostly on stipulated
facts,44 part of which conceded that Emerson could not carry the
burden of proving that there was no possibility of abuse inherent
in the particular situation." In theory, Justice Douglas' proposal
would eradicate profitting on advance information and allow for
certainty by letting the presumption control whenever the insider
could not produce the required elements sufficient to rebut.4 But
how does the defendant allege and prove that his transactions were
such that the door to speculative gain was not open? How could
Emerson, which had no actual access to inside information, prove
that there was no possibility for abuse? The effect of the presump-
tion is to say that all corporate insiders are basically dishonest and
that the burden should be placed upon the particular insider who
claims to be honest. Development of the idea requires definition
of the degree and type of evidence needed to rebut so the defendant
can apply his own business judgment as to the practicability of
defending or settling. Prior cases suggest that the following factors
41. Id. at 432, 438-439.
42. Id. at 440 n.13.
43. Id. at 434.
44. 306 F. Supp. at 589, 592; 434 F.2d at 920 n.3.
45. Supra note 42.
46. Mr. Justice Douglas' approach had been previously proposed. See, e.g., Munter,
supra note 8, at 90-94, and Painter, supra note 7, at 380.
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are, to some degree, determinative. First, the exchange was of an
involuntary nature in that the over-lO% owner did not (or it was
highly improbable that he did) influence the establishment of the
purchase price, the exchange ratio or the time of the exchange.,7
Second, a change of circumstances occurred between the purchase
and sale." Third, the exchange transaction involved "economic
equivalents." Fourth, all information obtained was from publicly
available sources.50
Shifting the burden of producing the evidence appears to be
more consistent with the simple language of the statute than does
sophist reasoning based upon elusive legislative intent. Future
cases will determine the better approach. If a court, based upon
the plaintiff's argument, analyzes the particular transaction to de-
termine if it is a proscribed "purchase" or "sale" before announc-
ing liability, then Justice Stewart's approach is being furthered. On
the other hand, a court may limit the holding of Reliance to the
proposition that the strict, literal interpretation of 16(b) is no
longer to be applied, and determine tentative liability upon plain-
tiff's presentation of a prima facie case. The court would then
proceed to analyze the defendant's arguments as to why the corpo-
ration's disclosure of market-affecting information could not have
given him an unfair advantage in his particular exchange, conver-
sion or other "unorthodox" transaction such that the imposition
of 16(b) liability would be unjustly harsh. The latter is the ap-
proach advocated by Justice Douglas.
Until further clarified by the courts, the particular questions
which now plague the practicing corporate attorney are: Who must
47. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
855 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). 47 TEXAS L. REV. supra note 7, at
1430; 117 U. PA. L. REV. supra note 11, at 1055.
48. "In general, an insider could perhaps defeat the presumption . . . by showing
'changed circumstances' similar to those required to avoid registration requirements under
the private offering exemption of the 1933 Act. See I Loss, Securities Regulation, 665-673
(1961); 4 Loss, Securities Regulation, 2646-2654 (1969)." 404 U.S. at 440 n.13.
49. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855
(1970). A conversion is not a sale under 16(b) where that which the insider surrendered and
that which he received were simply different forms of the same participation in his issuer.
This principle has been held applicable only to exchanges involving the securities of a single
issuer. Sales or purchases by an insider of his issuer's securities for cash, the securities of a
different company, or other property are within the reach of 16(b). See also Blau v. Max
Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
50. 434 F.2d at 920 n.5.
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come forward with the evidence of a potential for speculative abuse
of the insider's position? Is its existence an element of the plaintiff's
prima facie case, or is its non-existence an affirmative defense
available to the defendant? Allocating the responsibility for plead-
ing and proving the particular factual element is governed by im-
plicit considerations. For policy reasons, which litigant is to be
favored? Which party must bear the risk of getting the matter
properly before the court? Does the nature of the proof indicate
that it lies more within the control of one party, such that in
fairness the element should be allocated to him? In order to facili-
tate the application of either standard for the imposition of liabil-
ity, the above-mentioned questions need to be answered. Notwith-
standing the opinions in Reliance, the refinement of 16(b) is likely
to be the subject of litigation for many years.
By now the section's very longevity has increased its life expect-
ancy. Its basic rationale is sound. And the rough diamond is
gradually being polished through judicial construction and the
SEC's exemptive power . . .- though it would be illusory to
pretend that one could ever have both equity and relative auto-
maticity.51
MARTIN J. GREGORCICH
51. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1089-1090 (2d ed. 1961).
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